Trust and corruption: escalating social practices?
Authors: Kretschmer, M.
Conference: 14th EGOS Colloqium, Maastricht
Dates: 9-11 July 1998
Publisher: Bournemouth University
Place of Publication: Poole, UK
Abstract:Escalating social practices spread dynamically, as they take hold. They are selffulfilling and contagious. This article examines two central social practices, trust and corruption, which may be characterized as alternative economic lubricants. Corruption can be a considerable instrument of flexibility while trust may be an alternative to vigilance (or a collective regime of sanctions). Rational equilibrium explanations and psychological accounts of trust and corruption are rejected in favour of a model open to multiple feed-backs. Although there can be too much trust and too little corruption, and (unsurprisingly) too little trust and too much corruption, a state is unattainable in which these forces are in balance. Practices of trust alone can form stable equilibria, but it is claimed that such states are undesirable for economic and moral reasons. By contrast, practices of corruption are inherently unstable. Implications for strategies of control in organizational relations are drawn.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/3013/
Source: Manual
Trust and corruption: escalating social practices?
Authors: Kretschmer, M.
Conference: 14th EGOS Colloqium, Maastricht
Publisher: Bournemouth University
Abstract:Escalating social practices spread dynamically, as they take hold. They are selffulfilling and contagious. This article examines two central social practices, trust and corruption, which may be characterized as alternative economic lubricants. Corruption can be a considerable instrument of flexibility while trust may be an alternative to vigilance (or a collective regime of sanctions). Rational equilibrium explanations and psychological accounts of trust and corruption are rejected in favour of a model open to multiple feed-backs. Although there can be too much trust and too little corruption, and (unsurprisingly) too little trust and too much corruption, a state is unattainable in which these forces are in balance. Practices of trust alone can form stable equilibria, but it is claimed that such states are undesirable for economic and moral reasons. By contrast, practices of corruption are inherently unstable. Implications for strategies of control in organizational relations are drawn.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/3013/
Source: BURO EPrints