Das institutionelle Design der EU nach der Finanzkrise (The institutional design of the EU after the financial crisis)

Authors: Holscher, J. and Tomann, H.

http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24289/

http://www.wirtschaftsdienst.eu/

Journal: Wirtschaftsdienst - Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftspolitik

Volume: 96

Issue: 6

Pages: 393-396

Publisher: Springer

ISSN: 0043-6275

DOI: 10.1007/s10273-016-1988-y

In the midst of the EU's current "polycrisis ", several serious dangers threaten the future of Europe's unity. The looming Brexit vote as well as the refugee crisis and – above all – the rise of nationalistic, right-wing extremist parties demonstrate the fragility of the EU. One of the EU's fundamental problems is its institutional design in general. In particular the role of the European Central Bank is not fit for the challenges of the time. Moreover, the EU is facing disintegrative pressures while simultaneously pursuing moves towards deepening the Union as a reaction to the multiple crises. Against this background, it is highly likely that differentiation within the EU will increase. Deeper cooperation among small groups of member states will likely increase efficiency but may also reduce transparency, accountability and cohesion within the EU. If handled well, differentiation may also open new pathways for cooperation with the EU's neighbours and accession countries. The foundation for a fresh start in Europe is the Franco-German relationship, as only these two Member States together can prevent Euroscepticism from spreading even further and the new radical right from taking control of Europe.

JEL Classification: E61, F02, F45, H12,

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