Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle

Authors: Gyollai, D.

Journal: Nursing Philosophy

Volume: 21

Issue: 2

eISSN: 1466-769X

ISSN: 1466-7681

DOI: 10.1111/nup.12294

Abstract:

This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA’s failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA’s phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA’s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/36330/

Source: Scopus

Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle.

Authors: Gyollai, D.

Journal: Nurs Philos

Volume: 21

Issue: 2

Pages: e12294

eISSN: 1466-769X

DOI: 10.1111/nup.12294

Abstract:

This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA's interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA's failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA's phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA's consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/36330/

Source: PubMed

Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle

Authors: Gyollai, D.

Journal: NURSING PHILOSOPHY

Volume: 21

Issue: 2

eISSN: 1466-769X

ISSN: 1466-7681

DOI: 10.1111/nup.12294

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/36330/

Source: Web of Science (Lite)

Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle

Authors: Gyollai, D.

Journal: Nursing Philosophy

DOI: 10.1111/nup.12294

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/36330/

Source: Manual

Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle.

Authors: Gyollai, D.

Journal: Nursing philosophy : an international journal for healthcare professionals

Volume: 21

Issue: 2

Pages: e12294

eISSN: 1466-769X

ISSN: 1466-7681

DOI: 10.1111/nup.12294

Abstract:

This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA's interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA's failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA's phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA's consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/36330/

Source: Europe PubMed Central

Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle

Authors: Gyollai, D.

Journal: Nursing Philosophy

Volume: 21

Issue: 2

ISSN: 1466-7681

Abstract:

This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA’s failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA’s phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA’s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/36330/

Source: BURO EPrints