Pretending to care
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 506-509
eISSN: 1473-4257
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562
Abstract:On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/
Source: Scopus
Pretending to care.
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: J Med Ethics
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 506-509
eISSN: 1473-4257
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562
Abstract:On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/
Source: PubMed
Pretending to care
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 506-509
eISSN: 1473-4257
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/
Source: Web of Science (Lite)
Pretending to care
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics
Publisher: BMJ
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562
Abstract:On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient’s best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient’s true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/
Source: Manual
Pretending to care.
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of medical ethics
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 506-509
eISSN: 1473-4257
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562
Abstract:On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/
Source: Europe PubMed Central
Pretending to care
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics
Publisher: BMJ
ISSN: 0306-6800
Abstract:On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient’s best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient’s true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/
Source: BURO EPrints