Pretending to care

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 506-509

eISSN: 1473-4257

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562

Abstract:

On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/

Source: Scopus

Pretending to care.

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: J Med Ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 506-509

eISSN: 1473-4257

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562

Abstract:

On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/

Source: PubMed

Pretending to care

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 506-509

eISSN: 1473-4257

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/

Source: Web of Science (Lite)

Pretending to care

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics

Publisher: BMJ

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562

Abstract:

On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient’s best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient’s true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/

Source: Manual

Pretending to care.

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of medical ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 506-509

eISSN: 1473-4257

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108562

Abstract:

On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/

Source: Europe PubMed Central

Pretending to care

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 506-509

Publisher: BMJ

ISSN: 0306-6800

Abstract:

On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient’s best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient’s true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37744/

Source: BURO EPrints