Unintentional deception still deceives
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 513-514
eISSN: 1473-4257
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869
Abstract:In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/
Source: Scopus
Unintentional deception still deceives.
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: J Med Ethics
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 513-514
eISSN: 1473-4257
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869
Abstract:In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/
Source: PubMed
Unintentional deception still deceives
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 513-514
eISSN: 1473-4257
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/
Source: Web of Science (Lite)
Unintentional deception still deceives
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics
Publisher: BMJ
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869
Abstract:In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/
Source: Manual
Preferred by: Doug Hardman
Unintentional deception still deceives.
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of medical ethics
Volume: 49
Issue: 7
Pages: 513-514
eISSN: 1473-4257
ISSN: 0306-6800
DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869
Abstract:In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/
Source: Europe PubMed Central
Unintentional deception still deceives
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics
Publisher: BMJ
ISSN: 0306-6800
Abstract:In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/
Source: BURO EPrints