Unintentional deception still deceives

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 513-514

eISSN: 1473-4257

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869

Abstract:

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/

Source: Scopus

Unintentional deception still deceives.

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: J Med Ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 513-514

eISSN: 1473-4257

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869

Abstract:

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/

Source: PubMed

Unintentional deception still deceives

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 513-514

eISSN: 1473-4257

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/

Source: Web of Science (Lite)

Unintentional deception still deceives

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics

Publisher: BMJ

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869

Abstract:

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/

Source: Manual

Preferred by: Doug Hardman

Unintentional deception still deceives.

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of medical ethics

Volume: 49

Issue: 7

Pages: 513-514

eISSN: 1473-4257

ISSN: 0306-6800

DOI: 10.1136/jme-2022-108869

Abstract:

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/

Source: Europe PubMed Central

Unintentional deception still deceives

Authors: Hardman, D.

Journal: Journal of Medical Ethics

Publisher: BMJ

ISSN: 0306-6800

Abstract:

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/37953/

Source: BURO EPrints