Return of the evil genius
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Philosophical Investigations
Volume: 47
Issue: 1
Pages: 24-31
eISSN: 1467-9205
ISSN: 0190-0536
DOI: 10.1111/phin.12409
Abstract:In this essay, I consider whether it makes sense to say that our cognitive capacities—remembering, imagining, intending, hoping, expecting and so on—manifest as inner, subpersonal processes. Given whether something makes sense is a grammatical rather than theoretical or empirical issue, it cannot be explained but can only be better understood by describing and reflecting on situations in which it arises. As such, I approach this issue using the descriptive method of O.K. Bouwsma, which is a development of Wittgenstein's latter methodological approach of conceptually clarifying our bounds of sense. In the course of my investigation, I come to the realisation that cognitive capacities do not, as much psychology and cognitive science imply, make sense as inner, subpersonal processes. Instead, they make sense as personal capacities, which manifest in many ways of acting.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/39005/
Source: Scopus
Return of the evil genius
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Volume: 47
Issue: 1
Pages: 24-31
eISSN: 1467-9205
ISSN: 0190-0536
DOI: 10.1111/phin.12409
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/39005/
Source: Web of Science (Lite)
Return of the evil genius
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Philosophical Investigations
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN: 0190-0536
DOI: 10.1111/phin.12409
Abstract:In this essay, I consider whether it makes sense to say that our cognitive capacities—remembering, imagining, intending, hoping, expecting and so on—manifest as inner, subpersonal processes. Given whether something makes sense is a grammatical rather than theoretical or empirical issue, it cannot be explained but can only be better understood by describing and reflecting on situations in which it arises. As such, I approach this issue using the descriptive method of O.K. Bouwsma, which is a development of Wittgenstein's latter methodological approach of conceptually clarifying our bounds of sense. In the course of my investigation, I come to the realisation that cognitive capacities do not, as much psychology and cognitive science imply, make sense as inner, subpersonal processes. Instead, they make sense as personal capacities, which manifest in many ways of acting.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/39005/
Source: Manual
Return of the evil genius
Authors: Hardman, D.
Journal: Philosophical Investigations
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN: 0190-0536
Abstract:In this essay, I consider whether it makes sense to say that our cognitive capacities—remembering, imagining, intending, hoping, expecting and so on—manifest as inner, subpersonal processes. Given whether something makes sense is a grammatical rather than theoretical or empirical issue, it cannot be explained but can only be better understood by describing and reflecting on situations in which it arises. As such, I approach this issue using the descriptive method of O.K. Bouwsma, which is a development of Wittgenstein's latter methodological approach of conceptually clarifying our bounds of sense. In the course of my investigation, I come to the realisation that cognitive capacities do not, as much psychology and cognitive science imply, make sense as inner, subpersonal processes. Instead, they make sense as personal capacities, which manifest in many ways of acting.
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/39005/
Source: BURO EPrints